ABSTRACT: This paper uses administrative data for the two most selective Texas public institutions to examine the application, admission and enrollment consequences of rescinding affirmative action and implementing the top 10% admission regime. We simulate the gains and losses associated with each policy regime and those from assigning minorities the corresponding rates for white students. Challenging popular claims that the top 10% law restored diversification of Texas's public flagships, analyses that consider both changes in the size of high school graduation cohorts and institutional carrying capacity show that the uniform admission regime did not restore Hispanic and black representation at UT and TAMU even after four years. Simulations of gains and losses at each stage of the college pipeline across admission regimes for Hispanics and blacks confirm that affirmative action is the most efficient policy to diversify college campuses, even in highly segregated states like Texas.
Introduction
The year following the 1996 Hopwood decision 1 several campuses, including the University of Texas at Austin (UT) and Texas A&M University (TAMU), registered sharp declines in the number of black and Hispanic first time freshmen (Barr 2002) . 2 In response to the judicial ban on the use of race and national origin in college admissions decisions, the 75 th Texas legislature passed H.B.588-the uniform admission law-which guarantees admission to any Texas public university to seniors who graduate in the top decile of their class. Popularly known as the top 10% law, the uniform admission law was fully in force for the fall, 1998 admission cohort.
H.B.588 sought to increase college access to a wide spectrum of the Texas population by attracting the very best students of every high school to the State's flagship universities (Holley and Spencer 1999; Montejano 2001) . Initially the law was praised as a race-neutral alternative to affirmative action because it both rewarded merit and broadened college access (Tienda and Sullivan 2009) . Supporters claimed that the percent plan helped restore diversity to the flagship campuses, albeit in part by removing the standardized test score barrier for minority students who achieve academic excellence at their high school (Alon and Tienda 2007) . Over time, however, the top 10% law has become as controversial as the affirmative action regime it replaced. Opponents argue that percent-based admission regimes not only are a disguised form of affirmative action, but that they also are unfair to high achieving students ranked below the 90 th percentile who graduate from competitive high schools. Although the landmark 2003
Grutter 3 decision reversed Hopwood, the top 10% law remains in force until repealed by the Texas legislature. In effect, between the early 1990s and the present, judicial and statutory decisions produced four different college admission regimes in Texas (of which we compare three):
• Pre-Hopwood: affirmative action permitted (pre-1996); 4 • Hopwood: Judicial ban on affirmative action (1997);
• Top 10% law with continued judicial ban (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) ;
• Post-Grutter: affirmative action permitted, top 10% law remains in effect (2004 -present) .
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Because college admissions are highly scrutinized, publically and legally, researchers also focus on this aspect of the post-secondary pipeline, and especially on the admission advantage enjoyed by minority applicants (Bowen and Bok 1998; Long and Tienda 2008b ). Yet, Several recent studies have begun to fill this gap. For example, Long and Tienda (2008a) show that the elimination of affirmative action and implementation of the top percent plan not only impacts directly the most selective institutions, but also produces substantial indirect effects at less selective institutions. Their analyses of administrative data show that average test scores of applicants to less selective institutions rose after affirmative action was banned, presumably because students with high test scores who did not qualify for the admission guarantee applied to a broader set of universities. Furthermore, as the share of top 10 % applicants to highly selective UT-Austin rose, the average test scores of their applicant pool stagnated.
Although highly informative, Long and Tienda (2008a) did not consider changes in the number of potential applicants (i.e., the size of high school graduation cohorts), which is highly relevant in a state experiencing above-average growth in its college-age population (Tienda and Sullivan 2009 ). To address this limitation, Koffman and Tienda (2008) analyze administrative records for the top two flagships, making two important extensions. First, they disaggregate applicant pools according to the economic status of their high school, which is important to consider whether the uniform admission law broadens access across multiple criteria, as its architects envisioned. Second, they evaluate application behavior relative to the number of high school graduates in specific years. Their results show that graduates from affluent schools are significantly more likely to seek admission at one of the public flagships compared with their peers who graduated from high schools that served students of low to moderate socioeconomic status. Importantly, they show no change in the socioeconomic composition of applicants after the admission guarantees went into effect. Koffman and Tienda claim that the admission guarantee did little to raise application rates to UT and TAMU from poor high schools.
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Building on these insights, this study asks about the consequences of the changes in Texas college admission policies for white, Hispanic, Asian American, and black students who graduated from Texas public high schools. Specifically, using over a decade of administrative data for the two flagship campuses, we consider how students from these groups fared across the three of the four policy regimes in force since 1992. 7 To motivate the empirical analysis, we provide a brief overview of the changing demography of Texas higher education. Following a discussion of data and methods, we examine changes in each groups' application, admission and enrollment rates across the three policy regimes. The conclusion reconciles our findings with those of other studies using similar methods and discusses the implications of dismantling the top 10% law for achieving campus diversity and educating the fastest growing demographic groups to meet the State's growing need for high skill labor.
Our analysis is novel in two ways: First, we compute application rates by merging school-specific data on high school graduates with college applicants from those schools. This is important in light of the rapid growth of the college-eligible population in Texas (WICHE 2008; Tienda and Sullivan 2009) . Second, we simulate gains and losses for each group at each stage of the college pipeline under the three regimes analyzed. This exercise goes beyond conventional approaches that estimate admission and enrollment probabilities by quantifying the competition for seats at the Texas flagships. Despite popular claims that the top 10% law has restored diversity to UT and TAMU (Wilgoren 1999) , our results that take into account both growing demand and the carrying capacity of the flagship public institutions show that Hispanics and blacks are worse off relative to whites than they were under affirmative action.
Demography of Texas Higher Education
Owing both to high levels of immigration and high Hispanic fertility, Texas is one of the nation's fastest growing and most rapidly diversifying states. and 770 of all public school applicants, respectively in 1993 and 2003.
[ Table 1 about Here]
Of particular interest are the changes in application rates across the policy regimes and between institutions. AT UT-Austin application rates fell modestly for all demographic groups after affirmative action was rescinded, but rebounded for all groups except Asians once the HB.588 became law. Despite the modest rebound under the top 10% regime, Hispanic and black application rates remained below the levels observed during affirmative action; by contrast, the white application rate to UT returned to its pre-Hopwood level. Partly because the size of the graduation cohorts grew, the number of applications rose. For example, the 1993 white application rate of 7.2 percent implied roughly 6,600 students compared with 8,110 in 2003 (see
Comparable data for TAMU differ in several important ways. First, compared with UT the white application rate is consistently higher by two or three percentage points and the Asian application rate appreciably lower. Thus, the Asian-white application gap ranges between one and five percentage points, which is well below the 23 point gap observed at UT. Second, Hispanic application rates were systematically lower than those observed at UT for each period, but black application rates were higher for all periods except the top 10% regime. Third, application rates for all groups except Asians fell steadily during the observation period, rather than dropping and rebounding as occurred at UT. Asian application rates to TAMU actually rose in 1997, following the judicial ban on affirmative action; however, they plummeted nearly five points under the top 10% regime. In part the steady drop in TAMU's application rates reflects a provision in the law that allows rank-eligible students to select their campus. It appears that an unintended consequence of the law is a shift in applications away from TAMU toward UT (Tienda and Sullivan 2009; Long and Tienda 2008a) .
Although the changes in application rates reported in Table 1 intuitive assessment of the seemingly small changes in rates, we convert the application rates into numbers of students. Table 2 simulates the number of additional applicants under two hypothetical scenarios: 1) if each group's application rate remained at its affirmative action level;
and 2) if each group applied at the same rate as whites within policy regimes. For parsimony we focus on the two underrepresented groups that benefitted most from affirmative action and who presumably stood to gain most from the percent plan. These results show that the ban on race- The second counterfactual-which assigns white application rates to blacks and
Hispanics within policy regimes-implies that an additional 1,525 Hispanics and 768 blacks would have sought admission to UT-Austin annually under affirmative action. Owing both to growth in the college-eligible minority population and the larger disparities in application rates, the loss in potential applicants rises across successive policy regime. Under the top 10% policy, for example, UT's applicant pool would include an additional 2,604 Hispanics and 1,274 blacks if these groups applied at the same rate as white diploma recipients. The loss of potential additional Hispanic and black applicants at TAMU is substantially higher than for UT-Austin across all three policy regimes, which reflects the larger disparities in their application rates vis-à-vis whites. Specifically, the white-minority application gaps of roughly seven percentage points translates into an annual loss of potentially 4,683 additional Hispanic applicants and potentially 2,023 blacks under the top 10% policy regime.
[ and approximately 70 percent of the applicants for both universities under the top 10% regime.
The remainder of applicants to UT-Austin and TAMU were private school attendees, out-of-state students, international students, or non-traditional.
Admissions and Enrollment
Campus diversity depends not only on application rates, but also admission and enrollment rates. The former are constrained both by policy governing admission criteria and institutional carrying capacity, namely the size of the freshman class that can be accommodated within existing physical and human capital resources. Most of the public controversies focus on the admission decision, but the decisions to apply and enroll are potentially more important determinants of campus diversity. Conditional on admission, financial aid and competing admission offers from private institutions also influence the ethno-racial composition of college campuses.
The top panel of Table 3 shows the percent of applicants admitted to UT-Austin and TAMU across the three policy regimes. At both public flagships whites' admission rate rose during the no policy period, but returned to affirmative action levels under the top 10% policy.
At UT, Asian Americans' admission rates spiked in 1997, but fell under the uniform admission regime; still, Asian origin students were more likely to be admitted under the top 10% policy compared with affirmative action. By contrast, Asian admission rates at TAMU declined steadily after affirmative action was rescinded. The repeal of affirmative action did not alter Hispanic admission rates at UT, possibly due to a drop in application rates of marginal students who hedged their bets. Compared with affirmative action however, TAMU Hispanic applicants witnessed 10 and 15 percent drops in admission rates, respectively, in 1997 and under the top 10% regime. Finally, blacks' admission rates fell at both flagships after the repeal of affirmative action and their admission rates stagnated at 1997 levels at TAMU, but rebounded slightly at UT once the admission guarantee for top 10 percent graduates went into effect.
The second panel in Table 3 shows the ethno-racial composition of the admittee pools for the three policy regimes. The first two columns indicate that at UT the shift from affirmative action to the no policy regime benefitted Asians, whose share of admittees rose three percentage points, at the expense of Hispanics and blacks. As intended, the top 10% regime boosted the admit rate for blacks and Hispanics relative to 1997, but only blacks recovered their relative share of the admittee pool achieved under affirmative action. Based on the composition of the admittee pool, white applicants were the primary casualties under the top 10% law; their share of admittees fell four percentage points as Asian and Hispanic representation inched up one and two percentage points, respectively, relative to the no policy period.
Changes in the composition of TAMU's admission pools under the three regimes differ from UT in several ways. First, the white admission share increased steadily after affirmative action, averaging 77 percent under the top 10% policy. Second, although Asians benefitted from the repeal of affirmative action, their share of admittees did not continue to rise, as at UT. Third, Hispanic and black representation in TAMU's admittee pool fell under both policies.
[ Table 3 about here]
Because the top 10% law is restricted to in-state applicants, these estimates likely overstate the consequences for Texas residents. To gauge this possibility, the bottom two panels of Table 3 show the proportion of students admitted from Texas public high schools by race (panel 3) and the group shares admitted among applicants from Texas public high schools (panel 4). These distributions mirror those observed for all applicants, which is not surprising considering that about four in five of all students admitted to both universities hail from Texas public high schools. Despite the squeeze in admission rates due to growth in applications from
Texas graduates, apparently both institutions international and out-of-state students fill approximately 20 percent of seats at both flagships.
13
The right-panel of Table 3 provides parallel information for yield rates, namely the percentage of admittees who enroll at each institution. For all groups except blacks, enrollment rates rose at UT after affirmative action was rescinded. Under the top 10% regime however, yield rate for white and Hispanic admittees eroded slightly, but held steady for blacks and Asians. Enrollment patterns at TAMU differ in that the percent of admitted students who enrolled fell for all groups during the no-policy period and rebounded to levels slightly above those under affirmative action for whites, Hispanics, and blacks under the top 10% regime.
Enrollment rates are based on small pools of Hispanics and blacks compared with whites. The second panel shows that representation of black and Hispanic freshmen at the public flagships was not restored to affirmative action levels under the top 10% regime -at least through 2003.
At UT, Asian representation among first-time freshmen rose at the expense of all other groups, while TAMU's freshman pools became increasingly white. Campus diversity is largely driven by the high percentage of enrollees (about 85%) from in-state public high schools to both public flagships, as revealed by the lower two panels. The composition of enrollees based on the full pool and that based on in-state graduates is similar for both institutions and across policy regimes.
In sum, it seems that the shift in admission policy from affirmative action was beneficial for the admission and enrollment of whites and Asian Americans and had adverse effects on the representation of blacks and Hispanics. Unconditional on applicant characteristics, such as test scores, Asian Americans were the only group to increase their share of total admissions to UTAustin after the repeal of affirmative action. Both whites and Asian Americans increased their total share of TAMU admittees and enrollees after affirmative action was judicially prohibited.
In contrast, the total share of Hispanic and black admittees was highest during the affirmative action period, but both groups faced lower admission prospects compared with whites under the no preference and uniform admission regimes.
Admission Policy and the College Pipeline: A Simulation
To estimate the gains and losses of students associated with changes in policy regimes we simulate the number of admitted and enrolled students each group would have gained or lost had affirmative action not been repealed, or if the uniform admission policy did not alter the admittee and enrollee pools. Table 4 summarizes these results, which represent the policy impacts in student-units, or the "cost" in admissions (enrollment) to each group associated with change in their relative shares after the repeal of affirmative action. These simulations account for the carrying capacity of both UT and TAMU throughout the observation period, which is critically important under conditions of rising demand for slots at the public flagships.
The top panel of Table 4 indicates that if the group-specific share of students admitted to UT remained at affirmative action levels, an additional 393 Hispanics and 96 blacks would have gained admission to UT in 1997, when neither affirmative action nor the top 10% policy was in effect. As beneficiaries of the judicial ban on affirmative action, the gain in Asian and white shares admitted translates to 365 and 58 additional admittees relative to the number that would have been admitted had race-sensitive criteria not been prohibited. These gains came at the expense of blacks and Hispanics. The simulations for the top 10% regime show that Asians and "others" benefitted from the admission guarantee, mostly at the expense of whites, who potentially lost 550 admits per year. The top 10% law also cost UT 204 Hispanic and 14 black admittees annually, on average.
Parallel analyses for TAMU show that white students and "others," not Asians, benefitted most from the repeal of affirmative action. TAMU admitted approximately 219 and an annual average of 506 additional white applicants during the no policy period and top 10% regimes, respectively, relative to the numbers that would have been admitted had the judicial ban not altered the composition of the admittee pool. Asian Americans also benefited from the repeal of affirmative action at TAMU, but to a lesser degree than whites. As occurred at UT, the repeal of affirmative action cost TAMU black and Hispanic admittees. If their admission shares had remained at affirmative action levels, TAMU would have gained 366 and an annual average of 493 additional Hispanic admits during the no policy period and the top 10% regime, respectively.
The comparable cost of black admittees is 173 and 253 per year, respectively, during the no policy and top 10% regimes.
[ Table 4 about here]
The bottom panel of Table 4 reports changes in yields --the measure of actual campus diversity resulting from the conditional probability of matriculating, conditional on applying and gaining admission. The baselines for these calculations are the enrollment group shares achieved under affirmative action. The relative costs are similar, except that absolute numbers are lower because students apply to multiple institutions, but can ultimately enroll at only one. Whites and per year once the top 10% law was in place.
Explaining Group Differences in Admission and Enrollment Rates
Although informative, the findings discussed above do not account for group differences in characteristics associated with college admission prospects. In particular, the observed minority-white admission gaps likely reflect group differences in academic outcomes and high school quality, which is related to application behavior and college readiness (Niu and Tienda 2008; Koffman and Tienda 2008) . Therefore, the final set of analyses examine how admission and enrollment outcomes change after accounting for variation in applicants' SAT and ACT test scores, class rank, and high school attributes associated with college-going behavior, such as high school size, public-private status, and percent of students ever economically disadvantaged (see Long and Tienda 2008a; 2008b ).
The first model predicts the proportion of students admitted to both UT and TAMU, essentially replicating the findings reported in the top panel of Table 3 as proportions rather than percentages. These estimates serve as benchmarks for evaluating changes in the applicants'
achievements on their admission outcomes. Both before and after affirmative action was rescinded, Asians' admission advantage at UT was largely due to their higher average test scores and class rank. Comparison of whites and Asians with equivalent test scores yielded similar admission rates under the top 10% regime, but whites had a 2-3 percent edge under affirmative action and the no preferences year. These results are unaltered by taking into account differences in the types of high schools they attend.
Both blacks and Hispanics also enjoyed an admission advantage at UT under affirmative action; this is evident in the large positive coefficients (net deviations from the white rank) derived from model 2, which compares applicants with comparable test scores and class rank.
Once race preferences were judicially banned, both Hispanics and blacks lost their admission advantage; black applicants were 17 percent less likely and Hispanics 13 percent less likely than comparably achieving whites to gain admission to UT. Under the top 10 percent regime, the admission prospects of blacks and Hispanics improved, but remained below their white counterparts both because they are less likely to qualify for automatic admission in both integrated and segregated schools (Tienda and Niu 2006) , and because they average lower test scores among those who do not qualify for the admission guarantee. Taking into account group differences in high school characteristics altered the main patterns only marginally.
[ Table 5 about here]
Results for TAMU parallel those for UT with three notable differences. First, Asians did not enjoy an admission advantage under any of the policy regimes. That is, conditional on application to TAMU, Asian students were less likely to be admitted than whites with comparable test scores and class rank. Their lower admission chances, moreover, continued under the no preference and top 10% regimes. Second, compared with UT applicants under affirmative action, black and Hispanic TAMU applicants enjoyed much larger admission advantages-on the order of 17 to 20 percent-relative to white applicants with comparable credentials. Furthermore, Hispanics' admission chances were lower than comparably achieving white applicants by almost as much-even more for African Americans-once race preferences were outlawed. Third, under the uniform admission law, the admission prospects of black and Hispanic TAMU applicants were not much better than under the no preference regime, which is not the case at UT.
The right-hand panel estimates enrollment prospects conditional on admission after taking into account group differences in high school achievement and high school attributes that influence the likelihood of enrollment. Because the enrollment decision depends both on family financial resources as well as competing offers, neither of which we can observe, the statistical controls serve as crude proxies for group differences in resources and college climate of high schools.
Comparisons between institutions reveal sharp differences in enrollment behavior among minority groups. Under affirmative action, Asians admitted to UT were marginally more likely to enroll compared with similarly situated whites-on the order of 1 to 2 percent. At TAMU, however, Asians admitted prior to the judicial ban on affirmative action were about 23 percent less likely to enroll compared with equally achieving whites. These differences in enrollment behavior were moderated appreciably during the year that no preferences were in force. At both institutions, admitted Asian students were 1 -2 percentage points less likely to enroll than their white counterparts. Under the uniform admission regime, Asian enrollment behavior differed by institution; they were more likely to enroll at UT, conditional on admission, but less likely to do so at TAMU.
Hispanic admissions to both public flagships resulted in lower yields vis-à-vis whites under affirmative action. Once the race preferences were outlawed, however, the Hispanic yield rate was marginally higher than that of whites at both institutions. Most likely this reflects the higher socioeconomic selectivity of high achieving Hispanics admitted post-Hopwood, but other unobservables, such as qualification for merit and means-tested financial aid, also contributes to this result. Mimicking Asian enrollment behavior under the uniform admission regime, Hispanics admitted to TAMU were less likely than whites to enroll, but they were 2 to 4 percent more likely to enroll at UT compared with admitted white students with similar characteristics.
Throughout the period under consideration, African Americans admitted to the Texas public flagships were significantly less likely than their white counterparts to enroll at either institution. When race preferences were allowed, the black yield rate trailed that of whites by about 8 percentage points at UT and about 20 percent at TAMU. The ban on affirmative action lowered the yield of African Americans at UT, but there were only trivial differences at TAMU.
This seemingly equal yield at TAMU is deceptive, however, because it largely reflects the tiny numbers admitted, as revealed by Table 3 . The small black-white enrollment gap at TAMU under the uniform admission regime also reflects the low numbers of African American students who apply and are admitted to TAMU, where the share of blacks' enrollment has not rebounded to its pre-Hopwood level. By contrast, the black yield at UT is well above that observed under affirmative action, but it remains woefully low.
To summarize, the shift in admission regimes from affirmative action to no preferences resulted in lower admission rates to both flagships for Asian Americans, Hispanics, and blacks relative to whites, even when comparisons are standardized by students' academic achievements and high school characteristics. Furthermore, changes in admission rates to both flagships after affirmative action was rescinded and the top 10% regime implemented are negligible for statistically comparable minority groups. Inclusion of statistical controls for student achievements and high school characteristics does little to alter group differences in yield rates relative to those observed in Table 3 .
Summary and Discussion
Our analyses show that changes in Texas college admission policies have been highly consequential for racial minority groups, the largest and fastest growing segment of the State's population. Using data from the Texas Education Agency and from the administrative records of both UT-Austin and TAMU, we evaluate how white, Asian American, Hispanic, and African American students fared across three policy regimes: affirmative action, no-preference period, and the top 10% guarantee. Although it is commonplace to focus on admission and enrollment outcomes, our empirical analysis underscores that these outcomes are highly conditioned by the decision to apply (Long and Tienda 2008a; Koffman and Tienda 2008 ). This conclusion echoes that reached by Brown and Hirschman (2006) , who assessed the impact on minority representation in higher education after voters passed Initiative 200, a ballot measure that outlawed the use of race and ethnicity on college admissions in Washington state. They find that the largest impact was registered a the University of Washington, the state's public flagship; moreover, the drop in minority representation stemmed largely from the chilling effect of the ballot measure on application behavior, and less from changes in admission rates.
The empirical analyses produce three major findings. First, Hispanic and black application rates to the Texas flagship universities fell after affirmative action was banned;
moreover, owing to rapid growth in the number of high school graduates, their disadvantage in percent of applicants relative to whites grew over time. Although the declines in application rates to both UT-Austin and TAMU averaged one percent or less, this implies an annual loss in Hispanic applications that range from 240 at UT-Austin to nearly 700 at TAMU. The estimated loss of black applicants ranges from over 60 to UT to over 300 to TAMU. Second, both
Hispanics and blacks witnessed lower admission prospects at both UT-Austin and TAMU after the ban on affirmative action, and reached their lowest point under the top 10% regime. This finding implies that the number of underrepresented minorities eligible for enrollment to Texas flagship universities is reduced even further-a compounding of application and admission disadvantages that translates to fewer potential enrollees. Third, even with the declines in admission rates for Hispanics and blacks since the repeal of affirmative action, our results suggest that these groups would gain substantial representation in Texas flagship universities if they had retained their share of admits during affirmative action.
This result has profound policy implications that transcend admission regimes because they redirect attention away from the seemingly irresolvable differences about race or class rank preferences to encouraging greater numbers of qualified applicants to apply for admission. Koffman and Tienda (2008) show that graduates from affluent schools are significantly more likely to seek admission at the public flagships compared with their cohorts who graduate from high schools that serve students of low to moderate socioeconomic status. Our simulations indicate that equalizing their application rates with those of white graduates would have yielded 2,604 and 4,683 additional Hispanic applications annually during the top 10% regime for UTAustin and TAMU, respectively. Blacks would also have experienced an increase in applicants of over 1,200 to UT-Austin and over 2,000 to TAMU during this same period.
That the expansion of the post-secondary education system has failed to keep up with the growth of the college-eligible population represents a formidable policy challenge for the future for several reasons. First, competition for access to the State's public flagships will continue to intensify in Texas, at least through 2015 (Tienda 2006; WICHE 2008) . Second, legal and statutory challenges to both race preferences and the percentage plan show no sign of abating (Haurwitz 2008; Schmidt 2008) . Third, Texas invests less of its GDP on public education than several other states that have excellent public universities. 14 Over the long term the postsecondary system will expand to accommodate slower growth of high school graduates, but the State faces enormous opportunity costs from continued underinvestment in the education of its fastest growing population. Texas comptroller Strayhorn (2005) estimated a 500 percent return on every dollar invested in the state's higher education system. Educational underinvestment is seldom invoked as the culprit for the rising number of applicants denied admission to a four-year institution in the state, yet it is the ultimate cause of the college squeeze and a source of economic vulnerability for the state in the future.
In the short term, however, cultivating college-going cultures at under-resourced high schools is a potential high-impact, relatively low cost strategy to raise college application rates for underrepresented minorities. The Longhorn and Century Scholars programs developed by UT and TAMU, respectively, enabled economically disadvantaged top 10% graduates to attend their institutions. As important, these programs were accompanied by an aggressive outreach program that promises to increase students' orientation to college. Domina (2007) shows that the Longhorn and Century programs were associated with lower absenteeism and higher completion of standardized tests required by selective post-secondary institutions. Finally, it warrants emphasizing that an admission guarantee cannot guarantee enrollment, particularly for students from limited economic means. That Hispanic and black students are disproportionately concentrated in low resourced high schools requires strong financial aid programs to ensure that successful applicants actually enroll and graduate from college. Cir. 1996 Cir. ), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 Cir. (1996 .
2 UT-Dallas and Texas Tech University also reported sharp declines in the number of minority first time freshmen, as did their professional schools.
3 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) . 4 Because the Hopwood decision was delivered on March 18, 1996, and applications for the entering class of the fall of 1996 were mostly adjudicated, the Hopwood decision took effect for the entering class of the fall of 1997.
5 Although Grutter permits narrowly tailored consideration of race in college admissions, the top 10% law explicitly required a full year advance notice before announced changes in admission criteria could take effect. Therefore, no
Texas universities could restore affirmative action until fall 2005 admissions.
6 Long, Saenz, and Tienda (this volume) show that the number and geographic dispersion of high schools represented at UT did rise, but no similar change occurred at TAMU.
7 Our data do not span the post-Grutter period, therefore we can not evaluate changes under the fourth regime that permits affirmative action with the percent plan.
8 Texas Education Agency (TEA) reports higher graduation rates (circa 84 percent), but Swanson's Cumulative Promotion Index generates more accurate cohort-estimates. Specifically, the 67 percent graduation rate indicates that only 67 of every 100 9 th grade students will graduate four years later. Note: Number of observations is 224,893 and 163,027 for UT-Austin and TAMU, respectively. Group share of total admitted = group specific admits / total admits; proportion of total admitted from in-state public HS = group specific in-state public HS admits / total admits; group share of total in-state public HS admits = group specific in-state public HS admits / total instate public HS admits. For the analogous categories of enrollment, we replace the admitted information in the previous formulas with enrollment information. a Cost in admits = (total regime admits x group specific affirmative action share) -groups' actual admits during regime. Cost of admits is divided by 5 for UT and 4 for TAMU to obtain the yearly average during the top ten percent regime. The previous formula is repeated using the analogous information for enrollment. Note: Control vector includes sex, class size, percent of high school receiving free or reduced lunch, and public/private status of high school. Indicator variables for students with missing values on each covariate are also included in the regressions.
a Data excludes students who enrolled but were not granted formal admission (e.g., waitlisted, deferred enrollment), which corresponds to 3 percent of the sample at UT.
b SAT/ACT are composite scores divided by 10; ACT scores were converted to the SAT scale. Therefore, the estimates represent the average change in the outcome associated with every 10-point increase in test scores along the SAT scale.
